Whose mind? Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Whose mind? Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds. / Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico.

In: Theory & Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2016, p. 419.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Lo Presti, PUE 2016, 'Whose mind? Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds', Theory & Psychology, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 419.

APA

Lo Presti, P. U. E. (2016). Whose mind? Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds. Theory & Psychology, 26(4), 419.

Vancouver

Lo Presti PUE. Whose mind? Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds. Theory & Psychology. 2016;26(4):419.

Author

Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico. / Whose mind? Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds. In: Theory & Psychology. 2016 ; Vol. 26, No. 4. pp. 419.

Bibtex

@article{a763567fcdfc4a619250621d4c31c560,
title = "Whose mind? Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds",
abstract = "According to direct perception theory (DPT) people understand each other{\textquoteright}s minds by way of perceiving each other{\textquoteright}s behavioral engagements in the world. I argue that DPT admits of two interpretations. One interpretation is found in Searle{\textquoteright}s social ontology. The other interpretation departs from an enactivist account of social cognition. Both can make sense of what it is to perceive other minds, but in two different ways. The first claims that people can directly perceive states of mind shared in a community. In contrast, the second interpretation allows for direct perception of particular individuals{\textquoteright} states of mind in the context of participation in social practices. The two interpretations are argued to be compatible. People can perceive communal states of mind in another{\textquoteright}s responsiveness to action possibilities in social environments, not only the particular other{\textquoteright}s states of mind.",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Collective intentionlity, constitutive rules, direct perception, enaction, social understanding",
author = "{Lo Presti}, {Patrizio Ulf Enrico}",
year = "2016",
language = "English",
volume = "26",
pages = "419",
journal = "Theory & Psychology",
issn = "0959-3543",
publisher = "SAGE Publications",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Whose mind? Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds

AU - Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - According to direct perception theory (DPT) people understand each other’s minds by way of perceiving each other’s behavioral engagements in the world. I argue that DPT admits of two interpretations. One interpretation is found in Searle’s social ontology. The other interpretation departs from an enactivist account of social cognition. Both can make sense of what it is to perceive other minds, but in two different ways. The first claims that people can directly perceive states of mind shared in a community. In contrast, the second interpretation allows for direct perception of particular individuals’ states of mind in the context of participation in social practices. The two interpretations are argued to be compatible. People can perceive communal states of mind in another’s responsiveness to action possibilities in social environments, not only the particular other’s states of mind.

AB - According to direct perception theory (DPT) people understand each other’s minds by way of perceiving each other’s behavioral engagements in the world. I argue that DPT admits of two interpretations. One interpretation is found in Searle’s social ontology. The other interpretation departs from an enactivist account of social cognition. Both can make sense of what it is to perceive other minds, but in two different ways. The first claims that people can directly perceive states of mind shared in a community. In contrast, the second interpretation allows for direct perception of particular individuals’ states of mind in the context of participation in social practices. The two interpretations are argued to be compatible. People can perceive communal states of mind in another’s responsiveness to action possibilities in social environments, not only the particular other’s states of mind.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Collective intentionlity

KW - constitutive rules

KW - direct perception

KW - enaction

KW - social understanding

M3 - Journal article

VL - 26

SP - 419

JO - Theory & Psychology

JF - Theory & Psychology

SN - 0959-3543

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 333304825