Stabilization Mechanisms for Nuclear Investments v. Electricity Market Liberalization: The Case of Contract for Difference: Lessons from the United Kingdom and Romania

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The article addresses Contracts for Difference as state aid and price stabilization mechanisms needed to mitigate the risks stemming from the incompatibility of liberalized energy markets and nuclear energy investments. It starts by defining the Contract for Difference mechanism as state aid required to support nuclear investments. It continues by analyzing the issue of state aid in relation to the nuclear sector, with focus on the “market failure” argument as it transpires from both the European Commission’s assessment of the state aid scheme and the decision of the Grand Chamber of The Court of Justice of the European Union. Attention is dedicated to the uses of the same support scheme in two similar nuclear projects in Hinkley Point (United Kingdom) and Cernavoda (Romania). The article concludes that given the systemic differences between the two national energy markets, Contracts for Difference might not be a suitable solution for both of them.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Energy and Environmental Law Review
Issue number6
Pages (from-to)223-235
Number of pages13
Publication statusPublished - 2018

    Research areas

  • Faculty of Law - Energy, nuclear energy, state aid, market liberalization, Hinkley Point, Cernavoda, market failure

ID: 209382622